Abstract. This paper examines the discourse regarding medical selection of immigrants to Israel during the years 1948-51, which was a period of mass immigration in which approximately 700,000 people immigrated to the State, thereby doubling the Jewish population in only three years. The paper focuses on the debate that preceded the Israeli Government's eventual acceptance of a selection policy. We assert that the debate was shaped to a large extent by a combination of Zionist ideology and eugenic influences-two intellectual forces that had interacted well before the creation of the Israeli State in the first half of the 20th century.
INTRODUCTION
The marking of the immigrant as an Other by veteran populations-a recurrent theme in various societies and time periods-is commonly achieved through images of health and illness, with the immigrant seen as a source of disease, crime and social ills that "pollute" local society. The tie between immigrant and health raises issues of prejudice, racial discrimination, and equality in access to health services. In recent years questions of health and immigration have been fueled by "globalization" processes; as migration occurs with greater expediency and ease, the ties between health and immigration become increasingly salient. The bearing and form that these issues take on do, of course, vary according to the context of time and place. Indeed, as this paper aims to illustrate, the State of Israel constitutes a unique test case for issues of immigration and health.
The process of Jewish immigration to Israel in the 20th century is a topic enveloped by debates over how that immigration should have proceeded. On the one hand, consonant with the basic tenets of Zionism is the belief in entirely unrestricted entrance for all Jews; on the other hand are those arguments for selectivity based on various guidelines, including medical criteria. Although the Zionist Jewish Agency had already enacted a medical selection policy in the 1920s, it was only after the establishment of the Israeli State in 1948 and the mass immigration that followed that the issue of medical selection became a subject of intense debate amongst physicians and politicians. This debate would cast a shadow of suspicion on all who contributed to the development of immigration and absorption endeavours. Most significantly critics have charged those proponents of medical restrictions to immigration with practising ethnic discrimination. 2 The subject of this paper is the debate surrounding medical selection. Our focus on the years 1948-51 is based on two main points. First, these years are defined in Israeli historiography as the years of mass immigration to Israel in which, over a short period of time, about 700,000 people immigrated to the State. In 1952-53 there was a sharp decline in immigrant numbers, thus defining the boundaries of a period. Secondly, in 1951 the Israeli State officially declared its medical selection rules for screening immigrants. This paper discusses the debate over medical selection which preceded the acceptance of the selection rules by the Israeli government. It is our claim that the debate was shaped to a large extent by the combining of Zionist ideology and eugenic influencestwo intellectual forces that had interacted with each other well before the creation of the Israeli State in the first half of the 20th century. 3 Despite the broad support that the medical selection policy enjoyed amongst the medical profession and the political establishment in Israel, its imple-mentation during the period of mass immigration in 1948-51 was limited, mainly due to practical and humanitarian reasons. Its application on a broad basis after 1951 was against the backdrop of a dramatic change in the demographic composition of the immigrant population, which then was arriving in large numbers from North Africa and other Arab countries. Gradually the medical policy was taken over by a selection that was based more on social criteria, i.e., age and the family as a selected unit. 4 
HEALTH AND IMMIGRATION
Over history, as methods of transportation increased and improved, easing the transfer of goods and people between countries, various laws developed in order to prevent the spread of epidemics. 5 As early as the Renaissance, quarantine served as a key method used in the hands of the authorities and public health officials for preventing the entry of ships, cargoes, and passengers feared to be carriers of disease. 6 The quarantine did not focus on the individual; rather it was applied to the entire ship, the entire cargo or all the passengers. With the rise of bacteriology in the closing third of the 19th century, various countries initiated examination and selection practices for immigrants on an individual basis. For instance, in America between 1 January 1892 and 19 November 1954, 12 million immigrants underwent medical examinations designed to establish whether they were suited to enter the United States. In order to appreciate the key role medical personnel played in immigration, one should keep in mind that medical criteria were amongst the most important conditions for immigrants' acceptance to the United States and Canada at the outset of the 20th century. 7 The role of medicine and public health personnel in classification and absorption of immigrants in many countries at the turn of the 20th century went beyond scientific facets. Various studies of health and immigration, particularly in regard to the United States and Canada, reveal a close linkage between medicine, society, and culture in absorption of immigrants. 8 Xenophobia among veteran populations was expressed in public health officials' policies as well. One encounters many restrictions to immigration based on "objective" or "scientific" grounds that viewed immigration as a public health threat. Indeed, prejudices towards various ethnic groups underwent "medicalization" in the course of the 20th century-a trend reinforced by the rise of bacteriology and the possibility of carrying out laboratory tests that would identify sources of disease. It is not the intention of the authors to mitigate the importance of medical examinations or to claim that immigration does not carry important health challenges. However, a large number of historical works indicate how thin the line can be between scientific and objective criteria and unfounded prejudices and racism. Often metaphors associ-ated with disease, disease-producing germs, and their carriers were associated with immigrants indiscriminately, "marking" entire populations without any justification. 9 Beyond nativism and the rise of bacteriology, eugenics had a core impact on the formulation of immigration policy in the first half of the 20th century. As already noted in numerous works, eugenics was a major force within the social and political discourse. 10 The rise of public health combined with the new scientific methodologies of bacteriology and eugenics exerted a decisive influence on immigrant absorption issues. Even those who favoured absorption of immigrants regarded education and assimilation within the absorbing society to be imperative.
It would appear that in Israel these factors also had an impact on the absorption of mass immigration during the first years of the state. The huge influx of Jews from various communities in the Diaspora brought immigrants with a high incidence of disease, placing a heavy burden on the Israeli health system which was struggling under the constraints of meager budgets and an inadequate number of personnel. Tuberculosis, trachoma, syphilis, and other contagious diseases whose incidence had been reduced in Mandate Palestine in the two decades preceding the establishment of the state, genuinely threatened to break out anew, and fear of such an event was expressed in the attitudes and policies adopted by health system personnel at the time.
Even those leaders of the young nation, including David Ben-Gurion, who fervently believed in the principle of open immigration, ultimately had to acknowledge the overriding need to protect public health. Yet it would be a mistake to dissociate the real desire of the medical establishment to protect public health from the social and cultural dimensions of immigrant absorption policy during these years. Israeli society at this time was in the midst of a long process of crystallizing its identity, an ongoing process that is expressed in health and immigration issues to this day. The immigrants of that time, who were primarily Holocaust survivors and immigrants from Arab countries, presented a dual challenge to veterans who feared both the diseases they might be harbouring as well as the impact these "problematic populations" might have on the nation's identity.
One should not lose sight of the fact that many of the dominant leaders in the Israeli health system at the time were themselves immigrants who had received their training at medical schools in Central Europe and the United States, a fact that influenced the core role they assigned public health. The interface between the desire to protect the health of the public, the policy-makers' Zionist ideology and their exposure to eugenic thought forged a complex outlook for dealing with heterogeneous groups of immigrants. Through a discussion of medical selection one can trace how, in the first years of statehood, the Israeli medical and political establishments approached the triad of health, immigration, and identity.
IMMIGRATION BEFORE INDEPENDENCE
At its core, Zionism envisioned a Jewish state that would serve as a shelter for any Jew who wished to live there. Nonetheless, even before 1948, the specific needs of the imagined state often demanded selectivity from the Zionist agencies that organized Jewish immigration.
From the establishment of British civil authority in the beginning of the 1920s, British immigration policy stipulated the various categories of Jews who could receive permits to immigrate to Palestine: The first-Category A-was reserved for "capitalists," whose numbers were not great. The third and main group-Category C-related to labourers, whose numbers hinged on the economic ability of the country to absorb them. This quota, adjusted every six months, was entitled the immigration "schedule." Another grouping-Category D-covered dependents of the first two categories (such as children and women) whose livelihood depended upon the earning power of inhabitants of the country, or support from abroad. The number of capitalists was not subject to a quotapolitical or other-and permits were weighed on an individual basis according to the circumstances of the applicant. On the other hand, Mandate authorities permitted the Jewish Agency to control immigration policy among the other two categories. According to the mandate granted the British over Palestine, the Jewish Agency-an arm of the Zionist movement designed to champion and assist Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine-was entitled to arrange and control the immigration of Jewish laborers-Category C. Control over C category applicants allowed the Jewish Agency to monitor the core component in Jewish immigration. 11 Subsequently, the Jewish Agency adopted a policy that championed immigration of only the Zionist elements who were healthy in body and soul and capable of assisting in the building of a future Jewish State. At the same time the Jewish Agency prevented the immigration of others who did not meet Zionist criteria. 12 When the British Mandate imposed quotas, it did not implement any selection processes in order to determine which individuals won the prized entrance visas. In order to ensure its own goals, however, the Palestine Zionist Executive instituted a medical certification process. Naturally, young and healthy applicants, who could best enhance the effort to bolster Jewish presence in Israel through settlement, received preferential treatment. The limitations imposed by Mandate authorities, in practice, forced the Palestine Zionist Executive to prioritize applicants.
But the medical selection process took place also after immigrants had arrived. If a young immigrant was discovered to be ill, the Secre-tariat for Health Matters of the Jewish National Committee in Israel (the body that provided self-governance among Jews in Mandate times) together with the Jewish Agency undertook to return the individual to his country of origin, a step co-ordinated with the returnee's family. By the close of 1930, the number of immigrants returned to Europe reached several hundreds; the list of maladies cited included mental illness, tuberculosis, heart disease, diabetes, and intestinal diseases. 13 In this manner, the cost of treatment was saved and the immigration certificate passed to an able-bodied young person. It is interesting to note that at least according to our current historical knowledge, no open debate was found regarding the issue of medical selection by the Jewish Agency during the British Mandate. 14 In the wake of World War II, for political and humanitarian reasons, Zionist agencies eschewed all medical selection. But very soon after, in its first months of existence the Israeli State witnessed the rise of a fierce debate on whether to enforce a medical selection of the huge waves of immigrants entering the young country. 15 (Table 1) .
MASS IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL

Demographic Characteristics
These statistics place the State of Israel in a class of its own as a country in which immigration reached a scope heretofore unprecedented in modern times. Even countries such as the United States and Canada never absorbed as many immigrants in so short a time relative to the size of the absorbing society. Indeed it is interesting to compare Israel's numbers with those of other "classic" immigration countries during the same period. In the two decades following World War II the US received approximately 250,000 immigrants per year, Canada received 120,000 per year and Australia's annual number was at 100,000. Thus, the number of immigrants being absorbed in Israel in this period is comparable to the numbers being taken in by other larger immigration countries. 16 When one adds to this reality the underlying Zionist ideology and the heterogeneous character of the immigrants, the Israeli case stands out as a unique example in the history of immigration.
As one can observe from 17 The massive influx of immigrants during the first years of the state strained Israel's resources, especially since so many postwar immigrant groups were weakened and had higher morbidity rates than those of the veteran population. Arriving in the wake of Israel's War of Independence, they came without material and financial assets and in varying states of physical and mental exhaustion. Aside from malnutrition, the new arrivals suffered from a high incidence of disease, particularly tuberculosis, ringworm, and trachoma; 10% had medical conditions that required immediate hospitalization. Because the young state had few hospital beds, there was a fear that the sick immigrants would have to go without sufficient care, putting themselves and others in jeopardy.
This grave situation brought to the fore the medical selection dilemma: if and how the immigration should be regulated. The ensuing discussion, informed by the events of the war and the Holocaust, proved difficult from a moral standpoint as never before. The fledgling government had to wrestle with a host of sensitive points. Could they be responsible for postponing immigration of sick Jews-including whole communities-in order to protect the health of the veteran community in Israel? Could they really delay the immigration of Holocaust survivors and compel them to undergo medical examination, ignoring the emotional and psychological impact of such demands on survivors of the concentration camps? To do so would, in essence, turn their previous hardships into a handicap-a secondary form of punishment. Ultimately, the government would have to choose between the Zionist ideal of unfettered Jewish immigration and adapting or compromising that ideal in order to safeguard the survival of the new state.
THE DEBATE OVER IMMIGRATION IN THE NEW STATE
The first official discussion of the issue took place relatively quickly after the establishment of the Israeli State in October 1948, prior to the close of the War of Independence. Talks focused on the state's ability to direct and control the composition of immigrant groups arriving in the country. The Coordination Institute, which managed immigration and absorption activities in the government, the Jewish Agency, and a variety of other Jewish institutions in Israel and abroad, provided a framework. All the discussants agreed that Israel could not adequately take in and provide care for new immigrants while waging war, since the state already lacked sufficient resources for its thousands of war casualties. Allowing unfettered immigration would, all agreed, be impossible and irresponsible. Rabbi Moshe Haim Shapira, the Minister of Health in the provisional government, made one of the first explicit arguments for reinstating medical restrictions: "There is another serious matter-choosing the immigrants….Within immigration, there is too high a percentage of elderly and weak who are neither fit for war nor for work….In place of a frail Jew it is possible to bring in a Jew who is able either to work for the economy or wield a weapon…they are taking on to the ships mentally ill and those sick with tuberculosis and all kinds of diseases that are a disaster for the Jewish community and the country." 18 Minister of Finance Eliezer Kaplan also came forward in favor of "regulation of immigration in qualitative and quantitative terms." 19 Aware of the sensitivity of the subject of selection on medical grounds, particularly among Holocaust survivors, Kaplan nonetheless worried that "by lack of any monitoring of immigration, we are creating serious problems in the country." Arguing further that "in wartime we need immigrants who can be absorbed in the Land of Israel, both in the army and in the economy," he pointed out that the nation did not have the resources "to open old age homes and facilities for the disabled." 20 Despite the consensus among discussants regarding the difficulties of absorbing masses of sick immigrants in Israel, the provisional government failed to reach a decision about restrictions. They left both the moral dilemma and the practical difficulty to the government that would follow them. In January 1949 the nation held elections for its first Knesset-the Israeli parliament-and in March the provisional body gave way to the elected government headed by David Ben-Gurion. 21 The Ben-Gurion coalition brought the dominant socialist Zionist party, Mapai, 22 together with the religious parties; the smaller but militant socialist Zionist party, Mapam, 23 remained outside the government. 24 Rabbi Shapira, 25 who belonged to the United Religious Front party, a forerunner of today's National Religious Party, 26 continued as Minister of Health. Within a matter of months, this new government had to face the dire circumstances of the poor health of the new immigrants arriving in the country by the hundreds of thousands; at the same time, it had to consider the needs of the populations still waiting in European transit camps.
In April 1949, as the number of ill immigrants arriving in Israel rose, Dr. Yosef Meir, 27 the head of the Kupat Holim (The General Health Fund), the primary health care organization in Israel, called upon the government to immediately postpone the arrival of those carrying contagious diseases or suffering from chronic illnesses. In particular, Meir was concerned about the presence of active tuberculosis, which posed a grave threat to the population at large. It was already clear that tuberculosis constituted the core health problem of the immigrants, both among Holocaust survivors from the DP camps in Germany and among immigrants from Bulgaria, Romania, and Iraq who were the first large groups to arrive in Israel in 1948. In a letter he sent Shapira, Meir spelled out the urgency of the situation: 28 Meir particularly emphasized the problem of children with tuberculosis, for whom there was not one hospital bed in existing local hospitals. Israel had at the time no suitable solution for tuberculosis patients. In the face of what he perceived to be a potential catastrophe, Meir recommended that Israel keep sick immigrants out for the time being. He pointed out that an offer from American Jews would provide funding for treatment in Colorado and Switzerland. "Instead of bringing ill immigrants here," Meir argued, "and letting them wander about and infect others due to lack of beds, or to send them from here to America or Switzerland, wouldn't it be better to take these people straight to countries abroad…and to keep them there until they are cured?" 29 Meir's call to put limitations on immigration to Israel after establishment of the state was not a new posture for him. Over the course of many years while serving as a key figure in the public health domain in Palestine, Meir had viewed selection between "sick and well" as an essential motif in preserving the health of the new Zionist nation-inthe-making. As early as the 1920s and 1930s Meir held that Palestine had enough "local disease" and that there was no logic in importing new disease through immigrants. His conclusion was that there was no sense in bringing in sick immigrants who in addition to putting the society at risk would also require expensive care.
As a graduate of Viennese medicine, eugenics was not foreign to Meir and he espoused this approach in publications on pubic health issues. In an article entitled "Who has the Right to Bear Offspring," published in the early 1920s, Meir incorporates contemporary eugenic thought: "Doctors, sports personnel and national functionaries need to carry out broadbased propaganda for the idea: Don't bear children if you can't ensure they will be healthy in body and soul." 30 In the 1930s, Meir called upon kibbutz settlements to carry out medical tests for applicants seeking to join the kibbutz and employ selection among them. During the same period, he pronounced "Let not the sick immigrate to the Land of Israel" adding "Our country in its present circumstances needs healthy and strong persons. The weak and the ill fall as a burden on others and on themselves." Meir was not alone in this outlook and such postures were common to many of his colleagues, who were also graduates of faculties of medicine in Central Europe and brought similar sentiments with them to Israel. While eugenics was placed beyond the pale after World War II, it is logical to assume that Meir 's concerns for public health expressed in his statements on selection during the mass immigration reflect his earlier outlooks and attitudes. 31 Although Meir's arguments in 1949 were central to the debates that took place in the Knesset that spring, tuberculosis was only one part of a much larger picture-a panorama that included the health conditions in Israel, the conditions among the new arrivals, as well as the thousands of aspiring immigrants waiting in the refugee camps in Europe. A detailed record of the situation in Europe came out of the JDC (Joint Distribution Committee), the humanitarian aid organization of the Jewish community of the United States, which took an active part in financing and organizing mass immigration. According to data gathered by Harry Vitalis, the JDC's representative in Israel, of 120,000 Holocaust survivors who had already been examined in the DP camps before immigrating to Israel, approximately 12,000 needed immediate medical care, including 1,500 with tuberculosis, 400 who were mentally ill, 2,500 who were blind, 3,000 elderly in need of long-term care, and 3,000 unemployable elderly in need of welfare. Three thousand people were disabled and required medical support as well as full or partial long-term care, 600 had other chronic illnesses, and 500 children had mental illnesses, disabilities, or other functional deficiencies. 32 In the meantime, the Israeli health system had no long-term medical care solutions available, not even hospitalization. Vitalis estimated the cost of medical care for the 120,000 immigrants who had already arrived, including opening facilities for specialized hospital care and organization for hospitalization of the chronically ill, at roughly 1 million Israeli pounds, the equivalent, then, of 3 million US dollars. 33 According to further calculations provided by Dr. Theodore Grushka, Director of Immigrant Medical Services, the total cost for some quarter of a million immigrants projected to arrive by the end of 1950 would come to 2.5 million pounds. 34 This expense was, of course, in addition to the medical care the State of Israel would need to allocate for casualties from the War of Independence and care required by the civilian population in Israel. 35 As the JDC figures illustrate, immigration presented the receiving nation with a multitude of chores necessary for the absorption and care of new arrivals. Agencies in charge of Israel's medical services had to address the needs of the mental and physical well being of the immigrants, which were substantial. Along with social services, these bodies supplied essential medical services in order to safeguard the lives of the newcomers and to protect the public from potential epidemics. The Jewish Agency-which cared for immigrants during their first year in the country-recorded that among the 50,910 immigrants housed in 33 transit camps during the first half of 1949, 1,253 social welfare cases were registered, including 829 ill and disabled, 188 elderly, and 236 widows with children. 36 Because the country's limited resources were stretched so thin, tenuous conditions prevailed in the crowded camps-including tents without minimal sanitary provisions-and posed imminent health hazards. The infant mortality rate within the camps far exceeded that of the general population: 157.8 deaths per thousand births to 16.2 deaths per thousand births, outside the camps. 37 The information presented by Vitalis and Grushka, and Meir 's demand for suspended entrance in light of the tuberculosis threat, placed the new government squarely on the horns of a tough moral and ideological dilemma. Officially, at this time, the government maintained a policy of open immigration for all Jews. David Ben-Gurion's public stance and the decision of the first coalition government endorsed all measures to encourage unrestricted mass immigration in order to double the population of the State of Israel.
As one of the architects of the idea of large-scale mass immigration, Ben-Gurion kept his concerns to himself while calling for open and unfettered immigration as well as demanding that the state adjust itself to meet absorption needs. 38 Nonetheless, Ben-Gurion did not oppose internal deliberations in the government and Knesset on the subject of medical selection.
Ben-Gurion's worries did not revolve around a specific disease or even the poor health status of immigrants per se; what he found particularly worrisome was the overall picture, which showed that approximately 10% of the immigrants arriving needed medical care. It would place a heavy economic load on a nation still at war for its independence. Ben-Gurion recognized that Israel's resources were not sufficient to be able to deal with large numbers of immigrants in need of support for employment, education, and housing, let alone healthcare. 39 In his diary during the years 1948-51, he recorded his belief that exceptions to the open door policy should exist: "Among the immigrants there are many sick with tuberculosis and venereal diseases," he wrote, "and this should be forestalled. In January 1,500 patients with trachoma arrived; these can be cured. Severe disease should be forestalled." He also remarked there that Israel faced "an immigration…different not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from previous [waves of] immigration." Since the new arrivals would "come primarily from Jewish centers impover-ished materially and in spirit," he worried that "the character of the Jewish community of Israel is liable to be impaired and its pioneering image fade." 40 He held a particular concern about refugees from the Holocaust, on occasion expressing his fear that the trauma had reduced them to "human dust" and that they no longer had the capacity to become normal citizens. 41 Only four years after the end of the war, in fact, no one knew how Holocaust survivors would readapt to normal life.
Despite his reservations about bringing over sick persons, Ben-Gurion did not issue a wholesale order to prevent their arrival and generally brought all demands to limit immigration for medical reasons to the government or transferred them to Coordination Institute head Yitzchak Rafael, 42 who accepted responsibility for dealing with the issue.
Like Ben-Gurion, JDC officials found themselves torn between principle and practical limitations. Publicly, the JDC maintained that all immigrants should receive equal support and access, with no discrimination whatsoever between the healthy and sick or between the young and old. In discussions between Joe Schwartz, the head of the JDC's European branch, and the Israeli government, the parties agreed on this policy. Nonetheless, Harry Vitalis, the JDC's representative in Israel who had prepared the report described above, expressed reservations after his tour of the European transit camps. In the report that he and Grushka sent to the JDC management, Vitalis criticized Jewish Agency policy in the first year of mass immigration as eschewing medical examinations (1948-49)-a practice that contributed, he felt, to the influx of many tubercular patients.
Although Vitalis did not explicitly state his opinion in the report, the document clearly indicates that Israel should either reconsider unlimited immigration of the sick or somehow take suitable measures to prepare for their arrival. He based his recommendation of preparation for the sick immigrants on the precedent set by various aide organizations operating in Europe, including the JDC. These conducted medical examinations of Holocaust survivors prior to their emigration and sought local hospitalization for those in need of treatment. 43 Despite these measures, Vitalis worried that if Israel made no such policy of its own, the refugee populations of the dismantled DP camps would arrive in Israel en masse regardless of both their medical status and the state's ability to care for them.
The JDC's readiness to conduct medical classification among Holocaust survivors in the DP camps in Germany prior to immigration, in order to postpone the arrival of the sick and to care for the tubercular in venues outside of the State of Israel, was also discussed widely in the Coordination Institute. The Institute supported the solutions offered by the JDC and was inclined to transfer to it the responsibility for care. 44 On 18 May 1949, the Knesset conducted the first broad discussion of what was labeled the health and hospitalization situation, a discussion carried out in collaboration with the Finance Committee and Minister of Health Shapira. 45 The discussion addressed, primarily, the need to determine a government position regarding admission of sick immigrants to the country, but the discussants found they first had to confront the issue of the selection already in practice.
It should be noted that during this period, medical examinations of candidates for immigration were already conducted, but the data gathered had no connection to immigration permits; the information was used only to record an individual's health status and to plan his or her medical care. Thus, for instance, serologic tests documented the incidence of venereal diseases among Holocaust survivors in the DP camps in Italy and in camps housing immigrants in Poland and Romania. 46 In his initial contribution to the discussion, Shapira, who was responsible for reporting on the prevailing status of health matters in the country, stressed the threat posed by unfettered immigration and noted those efforts the Health Service already made to screen arrivals for dangerous health problems. He warned that with the mass stream of immigration, two main problems "…hospitalization of those with tuberculosis and the mentally ill-have worsened to a very dangerous degree….In regard to medical services all our budgetary calculations have proven false…in that the torrent of immigration decimates all calculations." Shapira went on to explain that "The [Health] Service attempts to prevent the immigration of sick persons, and there are preliminary medical examination, and there is supervision." These measures were, however, inadequate, as he noted: "among the immigrants rushing to immigrate to the country there are no small numbers that have learned to overcome all the checkpoints and they are arriving by all sorts of avenues." 47 Not least among these were the Holocaust survivors in DP camps in Germany, who heard with considerable fear the rumours of these restrictions. Since most had undergone medical selections in the concentration camps, these demands undoubtedly aroused painful memories. Many tried to avoid the examinations as a consequence and sought ways to bypass the Jewish Agency. 48 In his report, Shapira further detailed the budgetary strains in which the Ministry of Health found itself and emergency plans the Ministry had adopted to cope with hospitalization needs.
Shapira's revelation that the Health Service endeavored to prevent the immigration of the sick sparked angry responses from Left and Center parties, but for opposite reasons. Hana Lamdan, a representative from the left-wing Mapam party, said that she was "very saddened" by the proponents of these measures: "In recent days," she said, "there are all sorts of articles appearing in the press expressing the same tone: Instead of bringing immigrants and not preparing beds for the sick ones in hospitals, it would be far better not to bring them at all." 49 At the other end of the spectrum, representatives from the General Zionists attacked the Minister of Health for the weaknesses in the selection policy. 50 Party MP Shoshana Persitz argued that the Immigrant Health Service should be required to carry out a rigorous medical examination of all immigrants arriving in the country and insure that not one of them would evade the eye of the Health Service. 51 Forced later in the debate to clarify his initial position, Shapira articulated one of the fundamental points of the intermediate stance, pointing out "regulation of immigration and closing immigration are miles apart." He also argued that the government should, "for the time being, not permit bringing sick persons to the Land of Israel, but to seek a way together with the JDC to cure them abroad." And he concluded by correcting the prevailing misperception of the selection policy already in effect, absolving the government from responsibility for its implications when he stated unequivocally that "there is no directive to this effect." 52 Although Shapira managed to lower tensions within the Knesset for awhile when he insisted that no overall official directive existed for conducting a selection of immigrants on medical grounds, the government nonetheless had to deal with another incarnation of the argument-a public debate manifested in the press. Shapira's description of shortages in hospital beds and the details of the Knesset debate received broad coverage in the press, where the public raged over possible regulations on immigration. In April and May of 1949, Ha'Aretz journalist, Arieh Gelblum, printed a series of articles under the headline "I Was a New Immigrant for a Month." 53 Gelblum described in stark terms the distress of the immigrants in the Israeli transit camps, as well as the general absence of adequate health systems. He also addressed the issues of medical restrictions and possible regulation of the flow of immigrants. Specifically, Gelblum's writings raised the specter of ethnic bias: he portrayed North African immigrants in particularly insulting terms. When David Zakai, a leading journalist and senior editor of the ruling socialist party's newspaper, Davar, criticized this aspect of Gelblum's articles, the discussion flared into a fierce political controversy.
Later in May, the growing tension brought Dr. Meir, just appointed Director General of the Ministry of Health, to publish an open letter in Davar. He hoped that by clarifying the ministry's position he could ease the tensions. Like Shapira, Meir tried to explain the difference between regulation and restriction, casting the former in more benign terms: "We are not dealing with quotas for immigrants but with regulating immigration, and anyone who says that all regulation of immigrant means restrictions on immigration is merely admitting our utter failure-a sign that [the speaker] feels despair and believes that there is no possibility of regulation and therefore it is essential to restrict immigration." 54 In order to illustrate for his readers the danger of forsaking regulation altogether, Meir presented some possible scenarios: …in the end we will eventually reach the limit: another 10,000 will be crammed into the camp and 2,000 will leave, and again 10,000 will enter and again 2,000 will leave and after that what will be? Isn't it more logical to do things in advance, before catastrophe strikes? The same person from Bulgaria diagnosed with active tuberculosis in his country of origin who has nevertheless been sent to Israel, and the same Yemenite child brought by plane with active tuberculosis-I don't know if it's possible and if their arrival should have been delayed, but one thing I do know is that before sending them to us, hospital beds must be prepared for them. If we haven't done that, we are committing a sin against the immigrants and against ourselves. 55 
THE "SHAAR ALIYAH" [GATEWAY TO IMMIGRATION] CAMP
In January 1949, while the provisional government debated whether to conduct selection on medical grounds prior to immigration, Dr. Giora Yoseftal, 56 Director of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency, proposed the establishment of a central processing camp in Israel for new arrivals. Yoseftal anticipated that the concentration of immigrants in closed camps, even in Israel, was liable to raise moral quandaries. 57 Nonetheless, he understood the need to provide a process for a more carefully monitored and graduated absorption of new immigrants into the Israeli population. To serve this purpose, two abandoned British army camps were combined. In March 1949, concurrent with the initial debates in the Knesset, Israel opened the Shaar Aliyah [Gateway to Immigration] Processing Camp.
The plans for the camp called for it to process waves of 4,000-5,000 immigrants at a time. In theory, each shipload of new arrivals would go directly to the camp for immediate registration, examination, and classification. The sick would be sent to hospitals and the healthy to makeshift accommodations in tent camps and villages of capable workers. The processing schedule would operate on cycles of three to four days: the last 5,000 would be fully processed and on their way out as the next 5,000 came in three days later.
Medical classification of the immigrants in the camp was in the hands of the Immigrant Health Services. It processed individuals in order to locate the chronically ill and those with contagious diseases who could constitute a public health threat. An immigrant was prohibited from leaving the camp without completing the medical examination. Medical screening had a necessarily limited scope, focusing on the diagnosis of tuberculosis, syphilis, gonorrhea, trachoma, and ringworm. For this purpose, two minograph devices for chest x-rays and a serological laboratory for blood tests were opened. 58 For expediency's sake, the authorities determined that other tests and general classification could take place at local clinics in the areas where immigrants would reside after leaving the camp. The chest x-rays and blood tests were conducted by the General Health Fund, in hope that these measures would prevent a situation where an immigrant carrying a contagious disease would stay in the camp without examination. 59 The Fund took upon itself to submit test results within 24 hours in order to locate with maximum speed any tubercular individual who constituted a public hazard. The Immigrant Health Service also administered vaccinations against typhus and smallpox. 60 The plan immediately encountered severe problems. Thousands of people instantly flooded the camp beyond capacity. They remained for weeks and even months at a time, most kept there due to illness or the simple lack of options for work outside the camp. Its resources already overwhelmed, the camp could not maintain decent living conditions for its inhabitants. Yehuda Weisberger, director of the camp, captured this catastrophic state of affairs:
Due to crowding, it was impossible to maintain elementary sanitary conditions, the camp was inundated with mosquitoes and flies, mice and rats, the toilets and the sewage system overflowed and in the dining hall filth and leftovers were found in every corner….The immigrants were under lock-and-key, behind barbed wire, with armed police guarding them. The crowding in the wooden and stone barracks the British army had left behind reached at times cruel proportions. They stood in long lines three times a day merely to receive a food ration. Lines snaked for kilometers around health and customs services. Often the immigrants were forced to stand for hours until their turn came to use wash-up facilities….There was not always a large enough water supply, and often there were power outages, and at night the camp was under total blackout….We couldn't provide the immigrants with housing, even temporary accommodations. 61 While two-thirds of the immigrants left the camp within a week of completing medical examinations and registration procedures, the remaining third became a growing load that clogged processing and severely encumbered operation of the camp. From an inspection carried out by the director of the camp during his first days at his post, it became evident that hundreds of immigrants had not gone to the registration committee and had not appeared before the classification committee.
An ongoing shortage of medical staff contributed to the problems. In general, Israel suffered from a shortage of nurses, and the number of pediatricians prepared to work in the camp was small. The General Health Fund succeeded in mobilizing three pediatricians who carried out weekly visits in Shaar Aliyah. The station conducting the examinations in the camp had a staff of twenty-one personnel in the spring of 1949, including only one doctor. 62 Attempts to overcome the shortage of nurses involved use of untrained personnel who were not always able to provide the proper treatment. According to Leah Weisberger, director of the isolation rooms in Shaar Aliyah, the hospital attracted a number of questionable caregivers who were caught stealing and who callously neglected hygiene guidelines and children in their care. On the other hand, firing problematic staff could not ensure an improvement in the quality and often caused more trouble until a new employee could be found.
In order to pressure immigrants to hasten completion of their medical checkup, camp procedure allocated meal tickets according to an individual's progress through registration and medical examinations. Only immigrants who had to delay leaving the camp for justifiable reasons, such as parents of sick children, continued to receive unrestricted support.
Separation of ill immigrants from their families severely disrupted processing, since the relatives usually refused to leave the camp, choosing instead to remain until the ill family member was well or was transferred to a treatment framework outside the camp. Immigrants found to carry a contagious disease went directly into isolation in special quarters. Sick children, separated from their parents, were hospitalized in special children's wards. Tubercular patients in need of hospitalization went to the Tel Hashomer Military Hospital outside Tel Aviv, which had established a special TB ward for this purpose. The mentally ill and disabled also went to special frameworks that were financed by the government and the Immigrant Health Service or were funded by the General Health Fund.
Staff in the isolation wards for children in the camp testified that the primary difficulty was not the medical work but gaining the trust of the parents-which they needed in order to convince the parents to hand over their children for treatment. Leah Weisberger described the situation they faced:
We were foreigners in their eyes. They didn't trust us and their past experience had taught them not to trust even [fellow] Jews….The fear was clear in their eyes. When we finally got a child or a sick infant we were often filled with emotion in the face of terrible scenes. The parents were filled with despair as if they were being separated from their children forever. The phenomena was difficult and painful, but understandable for the sick infant or toddler of twothree years embodied all their new life, all the hopes and desires to rebuild their demolished family, and most of the children that came then were children of second marriages after their first children were lost in the Holocaust. 63 The emotional distress of immigrating and quarantine in the camp more than once sparked violence incidents, particularly toward camp staff on the part of enraged immigrants. The classification committee had to operate under the protective presence of guards and police for fear of bodily harm. More than once employees were struck by immigrants and sometimes had to flee from enraged mobs. In other cases police had to remove immigrants who refused to leave after months in the camp. Fistfights broke out among the immigrants themselves, many along ethnic lines, the upshot of cultural differences and the emotional and physical pressures of camp life.
Difficulties notwithstanding, the processing system succeeded in examining and caring for some 100,000 immigrants during the year 1949. From March to June 1949, the General Health Fund conducted more than 30,000 minographs and 29,000 blood tests. Yet the difficulties in the work of the Shaar Alyiah Camp convinced the Israeli government that they needed to find a better way to conduct medical selection of the immigrants.
Despite the advice of those most closely associated with Israel's health care system and the health of potential émigrés, the debates within the government and public discourses had not produced any strict guidelines for medical selection in 1949. The decision that did come-in January 1950-reflected the desire to fend off pressure from those in favor of selective immigration. This compromise came from Yitzhak Rafael, who served concurrently as Head of the Coordination Institute and the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency. Previously, Rafael had held firm for unfettered immigration. He had maintained that, because of political pressure and the dangers facing Jewish communities awaiting immigration in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Middle East and North Africa, Israel could not apply across-the-board restriction policies on medical or any other grounds (such as age). Therefore, according to Rafael, deliberations on setting such general policies were superfluous. Nevertheless, in light of political circumstances, Rafael agreed to head a committee to examine the situation, which resulted in the January 1950 decision. This resolution declared that unfettered immigration would continue but also that no one would be prevented from immigrating to Israel, except due to medical or grave moral reasons. Anyone who had to immigrate to be rescued would be brought in; all restrictions would be waived for any person in danger for his or her life.
Despite these measures, proponents of regulation continued to press their case and demanded a hearing within the government. In consequence, in May 1950 Rafael's directive was amended and broadened: all immigrants were required to undergo a medical examination prior to immigrating. In practice, however, little changed: only a handful of immigrants were held up. 64 
THE LAW OF RETURN
The gap between letter and practice persisted even as the Law of Return, 65 passed unanimously by the Knesset in July 1950, made Rafael's decision obsolete. The Law of Return in some ways officially narrowed the gateway for new immigrants to Israel. Declaring oneself a Jew no longer sufficed; potential immigrants had to prove their identity through birth and genealogy. The Law also addressed medical criteria for entrance: an individual could be prevented from immigrating "if the Minister of Interior was convinced that the applicant…was liable to endanger the public health or the security of the state….The explicit restriction in the clause…would apply also to receipt of an Immigrant Certificate." 66 Although the Law gave exclusive authority to the Minister of Interior-whose role at the time was filled by Minister of Health Shapira-to foreclose an individual's entrance into Israel, it did not specify the steps the Jewish Agency, or any other organization engaged in immigration, should take to locate those immigrants who posed a danger to public health. Theoretically, the authorities could apply this clause to thousands of immigrants with active tuberculosis who had already arrived and to many others awaiting entry. For the most part, however, the health clause of the Law existed in writing only: among the tens of thousands who came to Israel during this period, only several dozen applicants were rejected on medical grounds alone, and only a handful were returned to their countries of origin due to health reasons. In comparison with the stringent medical criteria adopted by the Jewish Agency in the 1920s, when hundreds of sick immigrants were sent home, this policy was relatively flexible.
In September 1950, word reached Israel of the dreadful circumstances of Jews awaiting immigration from Yemen. Several months previously, the route out of Yemen to Aden-a nation still under British controlwas closed, effectively blocking escape. By September, thousands of Jews who had already set forth from their homes had encamped near the border, without any assistance. When the border opened, the refugees flooded into transit camps in Aden; they were mostly in poor health, suffering from ringworm, trachoma, malaria, and tuberculosis, and some were close to death. International authorities asked Israel to send medical aid and to arrange as swiftly as possible to receive the immigrants before the gates would again close. In the following months up to 50,000 immigrants arrived in Israel. This population included a large number of children and elderly and many individuals who were disabled, frail, and chronically ill. The question of their health status and the ability of the Israeli health system to care for them did not arise in the government or in popular discussion at all. Political and human distress was the determining factor, and the possibility of selection on medical grounds according to the Law of Return was not invoked.
Yet quite soon after the Yemenite immigration, the medical selection debate once again resurfaced. In November 1950, Dr. Haim Sheba, 67 head of the Military Medical Service, replaced Meir as Director General of the Ministry of Health. Immediately upon assuming his post, Sheba propelled the issue of medical selection onto the public agenda. He felt strongly that Israel must set in motion a wholesale selection process on medical grounds without exception and that all sick immigrants should remain abroad until cured. In order to emphasize the danger inherent in totally unfettered immigration, Sheba argued that a high concentration of those ill in body and soul would jeopardize the future of Jewish community in Israel. To support his argument, he used examples from genetic theories which purported to show national gene pools weakened through a lack of genetic vigilance. 68 The eugenic origin of this theory is of course apparent. He quoted, for example, the work of Stevenson, an English geneticist who claimed Scotland had lost its greatness because it had not taken care to preserve its intellectual manpower. 69 Sheba, like Meir-his predecessor in the Ministry of Health, was the graduate of a Viennese medical school during the interwar period. It would appear that Dr. Sheba was even more radical in his call for medical selection than Dr. Meir. Sheba's policies had a decisive influence in adoption of stricter medical selection criteria. It should be noted that Sheba was very close to Ben-Gurion, and that he held Sheba's opinions in high regard. Moreover, with Sheba's appointment as Secretary General of the Ministry of Health, the demographic composition of immigration to Israel began to change as European DP camps emptied and greater numbers of Jews from Arab countries arrived.
Sheba's selection policy was patently manifested in the case of the Jews of Cochin. Confronted with potential immigration of the Jews of Cochin, India in 1951, Sheba issued an unambiguous directive canceling plans to bring in the entire community, claiming that they were inflicted with Filariasis and that their arrival could spread the disease throughout Israel. Sheba only rescinded his objections after a year, when the disease had been eradicated among the Cochin community. 70 He did not alter his belief that medical selection should be applied in a wholesale manner.
It would be overly simplistic to suggest that Sheba's position on medical selection was purely culturally motivated. As can be seen in the example of the Ministry of Health-led campaign against dermatological and venereal diseases in 1950-51, his views were largely influenced by epidemiological data. In this case the population examined encompassed immigrants from a wide array of countries, with no discrimination between the different places of origin. 71 Nevertheless Sheba's outlook on public health issues, like that of many of his peers, was indeed paternalistic and viewed medicine as an important tool in the Israeli melting pot. Thus, in light of Sheba's approach, a conflict of cultural values was almost inevitable.
Sheba bore considerable influence on other important leaders in the government as the necessity of his rigorous position became more apparent. According to Yitzhak Rafael, Sheba's unprecedented influence on David Ben-Gurion weakened to a large extent Ben-Gurion's previously enthusiastic support for unfettered immigration and contributed to harsh disputes over the issue. 72 Sheba also won the ear of Dr. Giora Yoseftal, Head of the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency. Like others, Yoseftal did not easily ally himself with Sheba-he did so only after much hesitancy and even then only after he was convinced that the medical system in Israel would crash if the influx of sick immigrants was not regulated.
These deliberations played out on the backdrop of the difficult conditions of the new Israeli State that tried to cope with housing and tending to the new arrivals. In the summer of 1950, in response to the arduous economic situation in general, and of the immigrant population in particular, the State of Israel decided to establish immigrant neighborhoods in the vicinity of cities and well-established agricultural villages, in order to supply housing and employment opportunities for the newcomers. These transit camps, or maabaro were thought to be the seeds of permanent villages for future immigrants.
The terrible conditions in the maabarot were blamed on the policy permitting large-scale and unregulated immigration. This discussion, just as before, focused on the dilemma of mass versus selective immigration. Newspaper reports on the demography of the immigration led to public criticism and the resurgence of the allegation that wealthy, well-established families stayed in their countries of origin while trying to get rid of the ill and disabled by sending them to Israel. Reports on the worsening political situations in Persia and Libya and the need to quickly bring in the refugees out of fear that they would soon be forbidden from leaving, did not assuage the critics. Immigration officials claimed that the absence of medical regulation together with the preference of wealthy families to emigrate to other countries (i.e., Canada, France, Australia) instead of Israel was resulting in a "negative selection." Even Yitzchak Rafael, one of the leading supporters of unobstructed immigration admitted that 80% of the immigrants in 1951 had come from countries in dire conditions, had undergone no medical examinations, were in very poor health, and were thus taking a heavy toll on the Israeli health care system. The first step towards applying restrictions was the establishment of medical criteria for selection. In November 1951 the executive of the Jewish Agency gathered for a series of meetings to determine a plan for immigration and to appoint a committee that would be directly responsible for immigration issues. The members of the executive were evenly divided between advocates and critics of medical selection. Both sides tried to tip the scales in their favour by soliciting the support of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion was distressed at the difficult absorption process that the immigrants had undergone as well as the particularly poor state of health that these immigrants were in, as opposed to those of earlier years. As a result, in 1951 Ben-Gurion was convinced that some sort of restriction of immigration had become a necessity. The moderation of his position made it possible, to a certain extent, to form the new immigration policy.
On November 18th, at the concluding meeting of the Jewish Agency executive, several measures were taken. Firstly, it was decided that applicants for immigration would be subject to severe restrictions. Secondly, a list was drawn up of countries of origin whose émigrés would be particularly investigated. Finally, medical and social criteria were established for determining immigration candidates. The medical criteria were such that immigrants from North African countries, Turkey, Persia, India, and Western and Central European countries would be allowed to immigrate only following a thorough medical inspection by an Israeli physician. Furthermore, it was decided that 80% of the immigrants should be under the age of 35 and that all applicants, except for those who were skilled in fields the country needed, would have to be committed to working in agriculture for two years. In response to BenGurion's request a section was added to clarify that in cases of "rescue" these stipulations would not be enforced. The members of the Jewish Agency had judged that people under the age of 35 would be healthier, and thus by limiting the number of people over 35 to 20% there would be less need for medical attention. The medical selection policy established in 1951 was begun as the demography of immigration was undergoing a radical change. It was not Jews from Arab countries, and not Holocaust survivors, who made up the majority of immigration.
It is hard to gauge the impact the medical selection had on trends and the scope of immigration in the first years of the state. Opponents such as Yitzhak Rafael claimed that the selection process dissuaded various communities from even attempting to immigrate to Israel, and he felt that it contributed more than any other factor to the cessation of immigration to Israel at the time. 73 Others argued that selection had only a marginal effect on the magnitude of immigration, ascribing the decrease to political circumstances or to the overall exhaustion of the reservoir of potential immigrants in certain exit countries. Despite the differences of opinion, at the beginning of 1952, when it became evident that the scope of immigration had dropped considerably, the Coordination Institute reviewed the question of selection on medical grounds and conducted a new round of deliberations in March 1953, headed by Ben-Gurion. In response to Ben-Gurion's opinion that selection on medical and socioeconomic grounds was having a negative impact on the desire to immigrate, particularly among North African Jews, Sheba suggested significant liberalization vis-à-vis the health status of candidates for immigration; he made exceptions for only a few specific diseases, such as tuberculosis or syphilis, in which case the individual could enter Israel after the condition had been fully cured. The discussions also established compound criteria for bringing in sick persons as part of a supporting family unit. When he summarized the session, Ben-Gurion made it clear that "If the entire family is immigrating, and there is a per-son whose livelihood must be provided for, this will not be used to postpone the immigration of the entire family." 74 
EPILOGUE
Throughout the course of the 20th century, questions of health and immigration have gained a greater and greater influence in determining how immigrants are received in various countries-questions that are often fueled by fear of the foreigner and the other. In more than one case, medicine has served as a "roadblock" for preventing the entrance of certain individuals, but in the final analysis those immigrants who were denied entrance into the various immigration countries because of medical reasons were actually few in number. It is more as an assimilation tool for immigrants into local society and as a litmus paper of the apprehensions of the absorbing society that medicine plays so important a role. This is not to say that public health considerations have not been relevant or justified, but history has shown that images of disease can spread rapidly, leading to alienation and tension. One of the test cases used to examine these issues is the question of medical selection of immigrants.
The uniqueness of the Israeli case in regard to medical selection of immigrants lies in the tie between Zionist ideology and the desire to build a new society, under conditions of mass heterogeneous immigration. The tensions this situation created were reflected both in Israeli society as a whole, and specifically within the public health policy for immigration. The medical selection of immigrants to Israel, first initiated in the 1920s under the British rule, took on a polemic bent primarily after the establishment of the State. The genuine public health concerns of a young state absorbing tens of thousands of immigrants conjoined with the generally ambivalent attitudes towards the immigrants sparked tensions between immigrants and the absorbing society. The Israeli health system drew on American and European wellsprings-including the problematic tendencies towards eugenic thought that most local doctors had been educated in during the course of their medical studies abroad. These traditions meshed with the Zionist ideology which sought to build a new nation and a "new Jew."
According to sociologist, Moshe Lisak, medical selection was not designed to limit the number of Jews of non-European origin as some have claimed; rather, it was employed to ease the burden on an absorption machinery that was unprepared to care for so tremendous an influx of newcomers. The traumas of immigration that resulted were, in essence, the upshot of the failures of an absorption and organizational system which had continued to operate according to regulations that had worked in the 1920s and 1930s, in a very different context. The failure came with the inability to grasp and cope with the change that had taken place in the scope and composition of the immigration. 75 In her book, Immigrants in Turmoil, 76 Dvora Hacohen, a historian of the mass immigration to Israel, emphasizes that those responsible for organizing the immigration at the points of origin in the Diaspora held tremendous personal power in interpreting medical restrictions on immigration. To a large extent, action and policy hinged solely on their decisions in the field. Therefore one should evaluate selection policy on two separate planes: the first-on the policy-making level, the second-on the implementation level. Hacohen asserts that most of the on-site immigration organizers in the Diaspora tended to be very flexible in interpreting restrictions while those who actually absorbed the immigrants in the State of Israel sought to stiffen the restrictions as a way of reducing the number of immigrants to manageable proportions. Thus, the controversy over medical selection was conducted not only between the immigrants and policy makers, but also between field personnel abroad and their supervisors in Israel.
Moreover, Yishai Arnon, in his study of immigration policy in the years following mass immigration-1954-56-suggests that medical selection unintentionally came at great cost. Upon receiving its independence from France in 1956, Morocco blocked the emigration of Jews. Those who had been left in transit camps due to Israel's immigration restrictions were force to stay in Morocco for another four years until Jews were again allowed to leave the country in 1960. Nevertheless, Arnon rejects the charges that medical selection was applied on ethnic grounds, concluding that the motivations were practical. The plight of Moroccan Jewry emanated from the fact that this community was the last of the Jewish communities to come to Israel during the period of the mass immigration, by which time most of the economic and health resources had been exhausted. 77 While Israeli scholars suggest different possible motivations behind the medical selection in the course of mass immigration immediately after the founding of the state, all agree that the immigration process was the source of serious trauma for a large number of immigrants-a trauma that many of the immigrants themselves directly blame on the medical classification they were required to undergo. The trauma continues to accompany these immigrants to this day, and serves as fertile soil for political controversy between Left and Right, Ashkenazi Jews and Sephardic Jews, then-immigrants and then-veterans.
It is precisely this inextricable link between medicine, immigration and the core issues of present-day Israeli society that makes this subject so essential. Through examination of the role of health and medicine in the absorption of immigrants in the first years of the State a significant contribution can be made to better understanding both the complex interplay of components that helped form Israeli society as well as how these factors contribute to the problems the country faces today.
